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VOLUME 23 FEBRUARY, 1948 NUMBER 1
"IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE" AS A DEFENSE IN
CRIMINAL LAW
A Criticism Based on Modern Psychiatric Concepts
EDWARD D. HOEDEXAMR, M.D.*
T HIS IS A CRITICISM of the decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington mn the case of State vs. Maish.1 The opinion states
that "appellant was accorded a fair trial m every respect, that the trial
court committed no error in refusing to give the requested instruction,
and that judgment and sentence of the trial court must be, and it is,
affirmed." Reference is made to the above decision in detail, the
instruction referred to was one requested by the defendant and refused
by the trial court. It follows: "You are instructed that if you believe
from the evidence that at the time of committing the acts charged in
the information, the defendant was suffering from such a perverted
and deranged condition of Ins mental faculties as to render him in-
capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or unconscious at
such time of the- nature of the act charged in the indictment while
committing the same, or where although conscious of them and able
to distinguish between right and wrong, and to know the acts were
wrong, yet his mmd and his will the governing power of his mind was,
otherwise involuntarily, so completely destroyed that his action was
*Hoedemaker, Edward D., University of Michigan, B.S., 1927, M.D., 1929; Chief
of Staff, The Northwest Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, Seattle; Instructor in
Psychiatry, School of Medicine, and Lecturer in Psychiatry, Graduate School of
Social Work, University of Washington.
1129 Wash. Dec. 49, 185 Pac. (2d) 486 (1947). Maish was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to be hanged, At literally the eleventh hour' Governor
Wallgren commuted the sentence to ninety-nine years.-ED.
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not subject to it but beyond his control, it will be your duty to acquit
the defendant, and in such case your verdict shall be not guilty" This
instruction clearly contains the "irresistible impulse plea," viz., "a
deranged condition of his mental faculties where, although
able to distinguish between right and wrong, yet the governing
power of his mind was otherwise involuntarily so completely destroyed
that his action was not subject to it, but beyond his control. "
The information alleged that Joseph Henry Maish killed LaDonna
Toscas by stabbing when she refused his sexual advances; some intent
and planning prior to the crime were indicated. In addition to the plea
of not guilty, the defendant made the following plea.
"(i) That at the time and place of the commission of the crime
charged, the said defendant was insane or mentally irrespon-
sible.
"(2) That said insanity or mental irresponsibility still exists.
"(3) That at said time and place of the commission of said act
charged, the defendant was motivated by an irresistible im-
pulse."
During the trial one psychiatric consultant stated that m his opinion
Maish was a psychopathic personality with "sexual perversion with a
sadistic tendency" A second psychiatrist agreed to the diagnosis "psy-
chopathic personality" and stated that this term applied to "the indi-
vidual who acts impulsively without thought of consequence and yet
has the concept of the difference between right and wrong." He went
on to testify that "he would be classified as sane, as knowing the differ-
ence between right and wrong." The rejection of the "irresistible
impulse" plea by upholding the trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury, as noted above, as well as the inadequacy of the psychiatric
testimony, which, if adequate, might have enabled the Supreme Court
to take a different view of the entire matter, makes it imperative, first,
that modern psychiatry's understanding of the nature of human be-
havior be set forth clearly at this time, and, second, that the apparent
conflict between so-called "freedom of the will" and a strict scientific
determinism be discussed. In instruction zo given to the jury this
issue appears to be joined, namely, that if the defendant, at the time of
the act, was able to distinguish between right and wrong with respect
to the act, he was then legally responsible. This implies that knowledge
of the difference between right and wrong should enable one to act
with free choice and in a responsible manner. It is felt that the tradi-
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tional use of the term "freedom of the will" fits the above. Any con-
sideration of the "irresistible impulse plea" and its relationship to legal
as well as medical thought makes necessary a consideration of modern
psyclnatric thought concerning the effects of mental illness on volition
as well as mentation. The terms "freedom of choice" and "freedom of
the will" need review and explanation, with particular reference to
modern dynamic psyclhatry's theory of human behavior.
At the time the "right and wrong test" was adopted as a basis for
determining legal responsibility in cases where mental illness was used
as a defense, psychiatry as a medical specialty was concerned almost
exclusively with describing and cataloguing the clinical phenomena of
the mentally sick. Until about i89o practically no effort had been made
to explain mental illness on a deterministic basis. The investigations
of Freud, which later led to understanding of unconscious mechanisms
and led the way to modem psychiatric thought, followed by nearly
fifty years the adoption of the "right and wrong test."'2 When one
considers the tremendous strides made by psyclatry since 189o, the
adherence by courts to such a doctrine may at first imply criticism to
the courts and lawyers alone. However, it is the opinion of this writer
that the burden of proof that the "right and wrong test" is outmoded
and not in keeping with our present knowledge of the nature of mental
mechanisms lies with the psychiatrists.
At the present time, psychiatry has rightfully taken its place among
the other medical specialties and can now apply to the understanding
of human behavior the rigid determinism which is a fundamental tenet
of all science. All of the phenomena of human thought, feeling and
behavior, all of the development of personality structure, both in
health and in disease, must be capable of explanation and understand-
mg as being the direct result of causal factors of heredity, early psy-
chological conditioning, or later experiences in life. In this there is
no place for the fortuitous. Whatever appears to be the result of
"freedom of choice" can be demonstrated to be rigorously determined
and, in the scientific sense, understandable. By the same token, "free-
dom of the will," as the term is used in philosophy, has no place here,
and what appears to be action taken as the result of a free choice is
action directly the result of specific determinants. One might well fall
into the error of assuming a hopeless fatalistic attitude in regard to
2 The "right and wrong test" is generally regarded as having its origin in the
opinion of the House of Lords in M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark and Fin. 200 (1843).
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human behavior unless the matter were carried further. If dynamic
psychology assumes a determinism as the basis for all thought and
behavior, how can one ever escape from the apparent dilemma of
having all one's thought and actions so determined and at the same
time exercise free will or choice? In the first place, as Knight3 points
out, "Determinism is a theoretical construct which fits the observed
data, as demonstrated by predictions which were fulfilled, and which
is essential to any psychology which claims to be scientific. The an-
tithesis to this construct is the construct indeterminism-pure chance,
chaos. 'Free will' on the other hand, is not on the same conceptual
level as are these constructs. It refers to a subjective psychological
experience, and to compare it to determinism is like comparing the
enjoyment of flying to the law of gravity" The sense of freedom in
choosing a course of action is one of the manifestations of mental
health. The absence of this sense of freedom is perhaps easier to
describe; in attempting to decide trivial matters a person without such
freedom is assailed by doubts, fears, inner compulsions, inhibitions,
and restrictions which tend to paralyze thought and actions or he is
impelled by urges and impulses over which he is unable to remain in
control. The healthy person chooses his course of action with a sense
of freedom and a feeling that what he does is determined by standards
and values which are a part of himself and from which he cannot
depart. This sense of "freedom" is the experience of the emotionally
mature only There is a spurious sense of freedom in those who as
children or immature adults perform acts which are in defiance of the
requirements of reality, but psychiatric study clearly demonstrates
that such individuals are not "free" in the healthy sense but are im-
pelled by powerful forces which are not under their conscious control.
For instance, one of the aims of modern psychotherapy is to demon-
strate to those so driven that such forces exist, and it is the repeated
experience of the dynamically oriented psychiatrist in psychotherapy
that the presence of instinctual forces not under conscious control
do in fact exist, can be brought under control of that part of the per-
sonality structure having to do with choice and volition, and finally
that the person so "driven" can thereby acquire the sense of freedom
of choice of the healthy Such a person when faced with a choice of
action of great importance proceeds unhurriedly to weigh factors
before choosing, but he is aware of long accepted determinants within
3 Knght, Robert P., M.D., Determntnsm, "Freedom," and Psychotherapy (August
1946), PSYCHIATRY 251-262.
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himself which do compel him but which he does not question and does
accept freely
Before proceeding, perhaps a brief summary of three basic concepts
in dynamic psychiatry may be of help. (i) The concept that in each
individual there is an unconscious and unorganized mass of instinctual
impulses, most open to observation in the young child, and composed
of both sexual and aggressive drives, the uninhibited expression of
which would be unacceptable to society; (2) that with time and the
influence of inherited and environmental factors there develops from
the first an or.ganized part of the personality termed the Ego which
exercises the functions of learning, perception, intelligence, judgment,
memory, and discrimination; (3) there occurs rather early an inter-
nalization of the restricting and restraining attitudes of the parents
which is set up within the personality structure. Dynanc psychiatry
terms this the Super-Ego, a good practical synonym for it being the
"conscience." The growth of each of these portions of the personality
is determined by all of the inherited and environmental factors bearing
on the personality A harmomous interrelationship between these three
forces is present in mental health. It follows that a sense of freedom
is a result of such harmomous interrelationship and is a natural by-
product of maturity Instinctual forces seeking expression are allowed
to enter consciousness and reach motility or action only if acceptable
to the Ego. The Ego is strong enough to exercise such control and is
guided by a set of dicta represented in the Super-Ego. The final result
is behavior which gratifies instinctual demands on the one hand and
the requirements of conscience and society on the other. The choices
of action of such a person feel "free" to him, even though they are
vigorously determined by the interplay of forces within him. It goes
without saying that all of us do not have the good fortune to have
experienced the necessary causal factors leading to healthy integration.
Again quoting Knight," "The fortunes of good parentage, physical
health, financial advantage, and opportunity are inequitably distrib-
uted, and the man-made rules fall quite short of the ideal of maximum
satisfactions for each person consistent with the rights of others.
In such an imperfect world every variety of human being is produced,
with perplexing problems of crime, insanity, incompetency, and neu-




In considering the psychiatric testimony in the Maish case, there is
no wish to criticize the competency of the witnesses, but I believe that
it was not elaborated sufficiently One opinion that Maish was a "psy-
chopathic personality with sexual perversion with a sadistic ten-
dency" should, in my opinion, have been elaborated as follows: Psy-
chopathic personality is a term applied to an individual who is mentally
sick in the true sense of the word in that, because of the vicissitudeb
of inheritance, inadequate parental care, and severe early psychic trau-
mata, the growth and development of his Ego, that portion of his
personality structure having to do with volitional control, has been
markedly disturbed and affected to such a degree that sexual and
aggressive impulses surge into consciousness, are temporarily uncon-
trolled, and pass into action which is frequently at odds with the
demands of his own conscience and of society
Another witness voiced the opinion that Maish was a "psychopathic
personality" and that the term is one applied to "the individual who
acts impulsively without thought of consequence and yet has the con-
cept of the difference between right and wrong." I agree that the
psychopathic personality has the concept of the difference between
right and wrong, and as a matter of fact believe it can be demonstrated
that it is quite rare for those mentally sick to be unable to distinguish
the difference between right and wrong so far as knowing it is con-
cerned. I do disagree, however, that the psychopath acts "without
thought of consequence. " Careful history and examination of such
individuals show that there is an attempt to control the impulse which
threatens to overwhelm the Ego and that there is some thought of the
consequence; however, the impulse is so powerful that the weak Ego is
unable to maintain this control so that the instinctual drive is allowed
to pass into action.
An attempt has been made to show that the belief that "freedom of
the will" or freedom of choice is the natural consequence of a knowl-
edge of right and wrong at the time of a criminal act is untenable in
the light of present day understanding of human behavior, and that
so-called "irresistible impulses" are as surely a manifestation of mental
illness as are disorders of thinking. Such acts represent the direct or
disguised expression of either sexual or aggressive instinctual drives
and have passed into action due to the immaturity and inadequacy of
the part of the personality having as its task the proper expression
and control of such instincts. The inadequacy of this part of the per-
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sonality, the Ego, is due to inheritance or early or late environmental
factors beyond the control of the individual, especially during his
developmental years. It is felt that the nature of the dynamic inter-
relationship of forces within the personality of the defendant leading
to his act was not properly and sufficiently explained and demon-
strated. Every tenet of modem psychiatry points toward the accept-
ance of the "irresistible impulse" plea as a proper defense in criminal
law That such a defense constitutes a threat to the security of society
does not stand up under the light of experience, and therefore has
not been discussed here.
The defendant's act as described in the excerpts from the trial
quoted in the opnion' of the Supreme Court appears to represent a
poorly and unmaturely planned act in which gross error of judgment
was present and where both sexual and aggressive instinctual impulses,
though altered and perverted, passed into action. The self-evident
weakness of the Ego, which was unable to resist these impulses, was a
manifestation of mental illness as truly as any symptom of any illness.
It is therefore felt that the defendant's plea of "irresistible impulse"
represents the true explanation of his act and is the only one compat-
ible with modem scientific knowledge of mental illness.
One of the foundations upon which criminal law is based is the
concept that criminal acts are morally wrong and that the .offender
should be punished. Modem psychiatry, with its theory of human
behavior, regards all criminal acts as products of abnormal personality
structure and development. It is evident that this constitutes a funda-
mental difference between the disciplines of law and psychiatry There
certainly is no difference of opinion when it comes to the question of
the necessity of segregating the offender against society from that
society in which he is evidently incapable of adjustment. However,
while it is hoped that the day will come when all offenders will be
regarded as sick and treated as such, it is obvious that this is not
possible now for practical reasons. Nevertheless, the adherence to a
judicial opinion of 1843 in the "right and wrong" test is in itself an
indictment of our courts; it is also an indictment of psyciatry for its
failure to present its case with sufficient force and clarity Surely the
"irresistible impulse" plea should be recognized by our courts. Such a
step would constitute a much-needed advance in legal practice and
would be in keeping with our present understanding of human behavior.
